Nykaa Business Model: A Detailed Case Study

Executive summary

Nykaa is best understood not as “an ecommerce company that sells cosmetics” but as a coordinated beauty-and-fashion commerce system. Its model combines curated multibrand retail, owned brands, content and discovery, physical stores, digital platforms, fulfilment, brand partnerships, and a developing international and business-to-business footprint. Each element solves a different constraint: trust and authenticity, product discovery, assortment, trial, availability, fulfilment, or margin. The strategic question is whether those elements reinforce one another faster than complexity and capital requirements grow.

This case distinguishes reported fact from analysis. FSN E-Commerce Ventures Limited reported FY2025–26 revenue from operations of ₹10,022 crore, gross profit of ₹4,516 crore, EBITDA of ₹752 crore, and net profit of ₹204 crore in its May 2026 investor presentation.^[s1] Beauty contributed ₹9,139 crore of revenue from operations and ₹819 crore of EBITDA, while fashion contributed ₹832 crore of revenue and negative ₹37 crore EBITDA under the company’s vertical reporting; totals include GCC and international activities and therefore do not simply add as isolated businesses.^[s1] These figures describe the year ended 31 March 2026 and should not be treated as permanent economics.

The thesis of this case is that Nykaa’s strongest model logic is a trust-led flywheel: authoritative discovery and assortment attract demand; demand improves brand access and first-party learning; better access, fulfilment, stores, and owned brands strengthen experience and gross profit; that capacity funds further acquisition, education, and infrastructure. Yet a flywheel is not automatic. Inventory, fulfilment, marketing, fashion losses, working capital, channel conflict, product authenticity, data governance, and brand concentration must be managed as explicit trade-offs.

Learning objectives and case method

By the end, you should be able to map Nykaa’s customer groups, value propositions, activities, revenue sources, cost drivers, resources, channels, and risk allocation; distinguish retail revenue from marketplace GMV and owned-brand economics; interpret dated segment evidence without confusing company-defined non-GAAP measures; analyze the role of content and stores; compare beauty and fashion vertical economics; identify reinforcing loops and constraints; and convert the case into an action plan for another consumer business without copying surface tactics.

This is an independent educational analysis based primarily on company filings and official investor materials, supplemented by strategy research. It is not investment advice, a recommendation, or a prediction of securities performance. Company presentations contain management-defined measures and forward-looking interpretations; readers should reconcile them with audited financial statements and subsequent disclosures.^[s2]

Company and model scope

FSN E-Commerce Ventures operates a portfolio that includes Nykaa’s beauty and personal-care commerce, Nykaa Fashion, owned or “House of Nykaa” brands, physical retail formats, distribution activities, and international initiatives. The legal group contains multiple subsidiaries, so the customer-facing brand should not be confused with one operating entity.^[s3] A business-model map must therefore specify the unit of analysis. This case analyzes the consolidated ecosystem, then separates verticals where official reporting permits.

The model serves several participant groups. Beauty and fashion shoppers seek discovery, authenticity, assortment, advice, convenience, and service. Established brands seek qualified reach, merchandising, launches, data-informed demand, and controlled presentation. Emerging and owned brands seek product development, distribution, and consumer learning. Store customers seek trial and assisted purchase. Suppliers and logistics partners provide inventory, manufacturing, transport, and capacity. Investors and employees supply capital and capability. The proposition and economics differ for each.

Nykaa’s consumer promise is not merely access to products. In beauty, uncertainty is central: shade, skin type, ingredient, efficacy, routine, authenticity, and status all shape the purchase. Content, reviews, curation, advisors, and stores can reduce that uncertainty. The official company description emphasizes domestic, international, luxury, prestige, niche, and cult brands alongside advice, videos, community, stores, and a beauty helpline.^[s4] This breadth creates choice, but it also raises the cost of accurate content, inventory, service, and responsible claims.

The unit of analysis also changes by decision. A shopper journey may cross app, store, warehouse, and support; a brand launch may combine merchandising, creators, inventory, and retail staff; an investor may examine consolidated capital and cash. Good analysis moves between these levels without assigning a consolidated margin to one order or treating a customer-facing channel as an independent company.

The Nykaa value-system map

*The flywheel is a testable causal hypothesis: each link must be supported by cohort, partner, operational, and economic evidence.*

Discovery and customer acquisition

Beauty commerce often starts before a product search. A tutorial, creator, routine, concern, occasion, trend, or store consultation shapes the consideration set. Nykaa can participate across this journey through editorial content, video, events, social channels, loyalty, app experiences, and physical retail. The business value is not simply traffic: effective discovery can improve conversion, cross-category purchase, repeat behavior, and brand-funded visibility. The risk is dependence on paid acquisition, creators, or algorithms that do not create durable customer relationships.

The FY26 presentation reported 1,894 million beauty visits, 44.7 million beauty monthly average unique visitors, 65.8 million beauty orders, and 19.7 million annual unique transacting customers; fashion reported 787 million visits, 24.2 million monthly average unique visitors, 10.1 million orders, and 4.3 million annual unique transacting customers.^[s1] These are management-reported performance indicators for FY26, not audited proof of causation. The key analytical question is whether acquisition cohorts retain and contribute after marketing, fulfilment, returns, and service.

Curated retail and inventory

In an inventory-led retail relationship, the retailer purchases or otherwise controls stock, recognizes product revenue subject to accounting rules, and accepts inventory, markdown, working-capital, and fulfilment risk. That control can improve authenticity, merchandising, launch execution, and customer experience. It can also create obsolescence, assortment complexity, and cash tied in stock. Beauty products introduce shelf-life, shade, storage, and regulatory considerations; fashion adds size, seasonality, and higher return complexity.

Nykaa’s FY26 balance-sheet presentation reported inventories of ₹1,642.2 crore at 31 March 2026, up from ₹1,417.5 crore at 31 March 2025.^[s1] The same presentation said working-capital days improved from 34 to 28 and inventory days were lower by four days, using revenue from operations as the denominator.^[s1] These statements suggest scale and working-capital discipline moved together in that period, but they do not eliminate inventory risk. Managers should inspect aging, availability, markdown, expiry, return, and cash by category and channel.

Owned brands and brand partnerships

Owned brands can raise gross profit and create proprietary differentiation because the platform participates in product conception, brand equity, and distribution rather than only retail markup. They also shift responsibility: product quality, claims, sourcing, safety, inventory, and brand-building require capability and governance. A house-of-brands portfolio can reuse audience, data, and channel infrastructure, but each brand must earn a distinct consumer reason to exist.

Nykaa attributed part of FY26 gross-margin improvement to higher salience of House of Nykaa.^[s1] This is management’s explanation, not an independent causal estimate. The strategic test is portfolio contribution after development, sampling, creators, discounts, working capital, and cannibalization. A gross-margin gain may be valuable while still demanding substantial brand investment. Emerging brands should not infer that launching private labels is a shortcut; the capability stack is closer to consumer-goods management than ecommerce merchandising.

Physical stores and omnichannel logic

Stores can perform four jobs: create trust, enable sensory trial and advice, serve immediate demand, and strengthen local brand presence. They can also increase rent, staff, inventory fragmentation, and coordination cost. Omnichannel value arises only when discovery, identity, assortment, pricing, inventory, fulfilment, returns, loyalty, and service work across channels. A store is not strategically omnichannel merely because the company also has an app.

Nykaa’s public descriptions refer to Luxe, On-Trend, and kiosk formats and an expanding store network.^[s4] The model decision is which customer mission and geography justify a physical footprint. Luxury discovery may require advisor capability and premium presentation; a kiosk may emphasize convenience and trial; an online journey may carry breadth. Each format needs a role, local unit economics, inventory truth, and a mechanism by which store learning improves the broader system.

Marketplace, distribution, and B2B

Marketplace and distribution activities alter who owns inventory, earns the retail margin, controls presentation, and bears fulfilment or credit risk. A marketplace can expand assortment with less inventory but needs seller standards, authenticity controls, dispute resolution, and liquidity. Distribution can deepen brand relationships and reach retailers beyond Nykaa’s consumer channels but introduces trade credit, sales force, and channel-conflict questions. The company lists dedicated distribution and international subsidiaries, evidence that these activities have organizational significance.^[s3]

Managers should not aggregate GMV, net sales value, and revenue. GMV represents the value of orders under a company-defined method; NSV and revenue apply deductions and accounting treatment. In FY26, Nykaa reported consolidated GMV of ₹19,963 crore, NSV of ₹10,000 crore, and revenue from operations of ₹10,022 crore.^[s1] The differences are not “missing money”; they reflect business mix, cancellations or returns, taxes, discounts, and principal-versus-agent accounting definitions described by the company. Any comparison needs consistent definitions.

Revenue model: where value is captured

The ecosystem may capture value through product retail margins, marketplace commissions and services, owned-brand gross profit, brand advertising or promotional services, distribution economics, and ancillary or international activities. The exact accounting and commercial terms vary and are not fully inferable from consumer interfaces. Analysts should avoid inventing a revenue breakdown that company disclosures do not provide.

Price capture interacts with promotions and loyalty. Discounting can acquire customers, clear stock, fund brand trials, or match competitors; it can also train waiting behavior and mask weak proposition. Contribution should be assessed after cost of goods sold, fulfilment, marketing and selling-and-distribution expense, payment, returns, and relevant operating costs. In FY26, reported gross margin was 45.1%, fulfilment expense 9.6% of revenue, marketing and selling-and-distribution expense 15.3%, contribution margin 20.2%, and EBITDA margin 7.5%.^[s1] These consolidated ratios are dated, management-presented measures and should not be assigned to every order or vertical.

Beauty and fashion show why separation matters. FY26 beauty GMV was ₹14,954 crore, revenue from operations ₹9,139 crore, contribution margin 22.5% of NSV, and EBITDA margin 9.6% of NSV. Fashion GMV was ₹4,954 crore, revenue ₹832 crore, contribution margin 10.2%, and EBITDA margin negative 2.6%.^[s1] Fashion’s lower revenue relative to GMV is consistent with greater marketplace or agent characteristics, while its economics face returns, acquisition, category breadth, and competition. This is an analytical inference; the filing definitions govern.

Cost structure and operating leverage

The major economic burdens include merchandise or materials, fulfilment and warehousing, marketing and sales, employees and technology, stores and leases, payment and customer service, returns, product and brand development, depreciation, finance cost, and administration. Fixed and variable labels are contextual. Warehouse labor may be semi-variable, store rent step-fixed, brand marketing discretionary but strategically necessary, and technology shared across verticals.

FY26 revenue from operations grew 26% over FY25, gross profit grew 30%, contribution profit 33%, EBITDA 59%, and net profit 183%, according to the Q4 FY26 presentation.^[s1] Faster profit growth indicates operating leverage during that period, but percentages start from different bases. Net profit was ₹204 crore against revenue of ₹10,022 crore, a reported PAT margin of 2.0%.^[s1] This shows why a fast-growing retailer can have substantial gross profit yet modest bottom-line margin after infrastructure, marketing, people, leases, depreciation, finance, and tax.

Cash offers another lens. The company reported FY26 cash flow from operations of ₹644.3 crore, investing cash outflow of ₹162.5 crore, financing outflow of ₹429.6 crore, and ₹177.2 crore of cash and cash equivalents at year end.^[s1] It also reported net debt falling from ₹623 crore in FY25 to ₹329 crore in FY26.^[s1] These figures should be reconciled with audited consolidated statements and definitions; they nevertheless illustrate that working capital, leases, borrowings, and capital expenditure are inseparable from model quality.

The trust-led flywheel

The proposed flywheel has six causal links. First, content, assortment, authenticity assurance, brand launches, and stores reduce discovery and trust friction. Second, qualified discovery creates transactions and first-party behavioral learning. Third, demand and merchandising capability improve value for brand partners. Fourth, stronger brand access and owned-brand development deepen assortment and gross-profit opportunities. Fifth, contribution funds fulfilment, technology, service, content, and acquisition. Sixth, reliable experience and recovery support retention and advocacy. Treating these links as an interdependent activity system follows business-model research rather than assuming that one visible tactic explains performance.^[s6] Where multiple participant groups interact, platform analysis also warns that liquidity, governance, and cross-side value determine whether growth reinforces the system.^[s7]

Every arrow can fail. Content can attract low-intent traffic. More assortment can create search and inventory complexity. First-party data can be noisy or governed poorly. Brand leverage can generate channel conflict. Owned brands can weaken neutrality perceptions. Marketing can purchase volume without retention. Fulfilment failures can destroy the trust that acquisition created. A flywheel is a hypothesis about reinforcement; the evidence should be cohort retention, cross-category behavior, supplier outcomes, availability, contribution, and complaint or recovery quality.

*Never substitute GMV for revenue or contribution for cash; reconcile definitions before drawing a strategic conclusion.*

Competitive advantage and defensibility

Nykaa’s possible advantages are system-level: beauty-focused trust and recall, customer relationships, content and community, breadth of brand partnerships, store and fulfilment infrastructure, data-informed merchandising, owned brands, and organizational knowledge of Indian beauty demand. Each is imitable in part. A large horizontal marketplace can match logistics; a specialist can match content; a brand can build direct commerce; a retailer can open stores. Defensibility depends on fit among the parts and the time required to reproduce relationships, data, service quality, assortment, and consumer memory together.^[s5]

Scale can strengthen purchasing, technology reuse, marketing reach, and fulfilment utilization, but scale also creates complexity. Brands may resist dependence; customers may compare prices; assortment may overwhelm; stores may dilute capital productivity; regulators may scrutinize product claims, competition, privacy, and consumer practices. Strategy should therefore identify what Nykaa will be distinctively good at and what it will refuse, not merely add channels and categories.

Beauty versus fashion: one ecosystem, different equations

Beauty can support repeat purchase, advice, routines, owned-brand innovation, and relatively standardized fulfilment, though shade and claims remain complex. Fashion has higher size and style uncertainty, return risk, fragmented supply, trend cycles, marketplace accounting, and intense platform competition. Sharing audience and infrastructure may help, but it does not make the unit economics identical.

The FY26 official vertical results showed positive beauty EBITDA and negative fashion EBITDA.^[s1] A responsible case analysis does not conclude that fashion is necessarily a mistake or that scale guarantees profitability. It asks what strategic role fashion plays, what milestones demonstrate improving customer and contribution economics, which resources are truly shared, what incremental investment is required, and what evidence should trigger redesign. Cross-subsidy should be explicit and time-bounded.

Risks and failure modes

Authenticity or product-quality failure: trust can collapse faster than it is built. Controls need authorized sourcing, traceability, storage standards, complaint investigation, recall capability, and transparent recovery.

Inventory and working-capital stress: growth can consume cash through stock and receivables. Category-level aging, availability, markdown, payable terms, and cash conversion should guide buying.

Marketing dependence: traffic growth may be uneconomic if cohorts do not retain. Separate organic, paid, creator, store-assisted, and loyalty cohorts; measure incremental contribution and payback.

Owned-brand conflict: proprietary brands can improve margin while raising concerns among partner brands or consumers. Govern placement, claims, review integrity, and category strategy.

Fashion complexity: GMV growth can coexist with low revenue recognition, returns, and negative EBITDA. Use contribution after returns and service, not top-line GMV alone.

Omnichannel inconsistency: disconnected price, inventory, loyalty, advisor, or return policies teach customers that channels are separate. Define customer missions and one accountable owner for each cross-channel journey.

Platform, privacy, and AI risk: personalization and generative tools can improve discovery while creating bias, opacity, consent, intellectual-property, and unsafe-advice risks. India’s dark-pattern guidelines make interface manipulation a governance concern rather than merely a conversion tactic.^[s8] Personal-data processing must also be designed against applicable duties and rights under India’s Digital Personal Data Protection Act and subsequent rules.^[s9] High-consequence product recommendations need substantiated claims and human or professional escalation where appropriate.

Metrics for managing the model

Customer metrics should include qualified traffic, activation, search success, conversion, first-purchase experience, repeat rate, order frequency, category expansion, loyalty behavior, return, complaint, resolution, and outcome-quality proxies. Brand-partner metrics should include assortment availability, launch execution, sell-through, returns, content quality, campaign incrementality, payment, and supplier concentration. Store metrics should connect local demand, trial, conversion, repeat and digital spillover, staff productivity, occupancy, inventory, and contribution.

Economic metrics should reconcile GMV to NSV, revenue, gross profit, contribution, EBITDA, cash flow, and return on capital. The FY26 presentation reported return on capital employed of 21.2%, fixed-asset turnover of 9.9 times, and working-capital days of 28 under company definitions.^[s1] These are valuable trend indicators but not substitutes for category, cohort, and investment-level returns. Every metric should name its definition, period, source, owner, and decision.

Guardrails should measure product incidents, counterfeit allegations, misleading claims, vulnerable-customer complaints, privacy requests, accessibility failures, delivery harm, supplier disputes, employee safety, environmental burden, and unresolved grievances. A retail model that optimizes conversion while externalizing harm is not well managed.

Review the chain by vertical, category, channel, geography, and acquisition cohort. Aggregate improvement can otherwise conceal a deteriorating return profile, a store cluster with weak local economics, or a high-growth category whose returns and service consume contribution.

Governance, ethics, and limits

Nykaa’s architecture allocates benefits, burdens, information, and bargaining power across shoppers, employees, creators, delivery workers, suppliers, brand partners, and communities. Governance therefore cannot be reduced to statutory compliance. Product authenticity, ingredient and efficacy claims, review integrity, recommendation safety, accessibility, labor conditions, supplier payment, packaging, waste, and grievance recovery affect whether the trust proposition is deserved. Managers should identify the party carrying each failure cost and provide a practical route to correction.

Personalization should use the minimum data necessary for a stated purpose, offer meaningful choice, and avoid converting probabilistic inferences into sensitive or discriminatory judgments. Sponsored content and owned-brand placement should be recognizable. High-consequence beauty advice requires substantiated claims and escalation beyond automated recommendations. Expansion should not hide negative fashion contribution, unsold inventory, or environmental costs behind consolidated growth. Board and operating reviews need named owners, incident thresholds, independent assurance where appropriate, and evidence that commercial incentives do not reward misleading urgency or obstructed cancellation. These safeguards protect customer welfare and the model’s core economic asset: credible trust.

Transferable lessons for founders and managers

First, specialize around a difficult trust problem rather than treating focus as a smaller catalogue. Nykaa’s beauty logic shows how education, curation, assortment, and service can work together. Second, combine channels only when they solve different customer frictions and share operating truth. Third, treat owned brands as a capability-intensive portfolio, not a margin hack. Fourth, separate vertical economics and avoid using aggregate growth to hide a weak unit. Fifth, build contribution and cash discipline alongside scale.

What should not be copied blindly? Celebrity or creator campaigns without retention evidence; physical stores without a mission and local contribution; category expansion based solely on traffic; private labels without quality and brand capability; marketplace breadth without trust controls; or a loyalty programme that rewards discounts rather than useful behavior. The principle is coherence, not imitation.

Action Plan

Weeks 1–2: define the trust problem and unit of analysis

Choose one category and customer situation. Identify shopper, payer, influencer, supplier, and regulator. Document uncertainty around authenticity, fit, efficacy, availability, advice, delivery, and recovery. Decide whether the model will hold inventory, act as agent, distribute to businesses, own brands, or combine roles. State the accounting and risk implication of each role.

Weeks 3–4: map the commerce system

Map discovery, evaluation, transaction, fulfilment, use, return, service, and repeat. Assign every activity, data field, obligation, and failure to an owner. Build one inventory and order truth before promising omnichannel convenience. Define where content assists a decision, how claims are substantiated, and when a customer needs expert escalation.

Weeks 5–8: test contribution and retention

Run a bounded category-and-geography pilot. Track cohort acquisition, conversion, first outcome, repeat, return, support, gross profit, fulfilment, promotions, contribution, inventory days, payback, and complaints. Test a store or assisted channel only where it changes a specific mission. Separate owned-brand, retail, and marketplace economics.

Weeks 9–12: choose the reinforcing loop

Identify which observed relationship compounds: education to qualified purchase, stores to retention, supplier access to assortment, owned brands to contribution, or data to better merchandising. Fund only loops supported by evidence. Create stop or redesign thresholds for categories with poor retention, returns, negative contribution, excessive working capital, or unacceptable harm. Present the decision with a downside cash case.

Executive gate and operating cadence

At the gate, reconcile customer evidence with the category contribution statement, inventory and cash position, service incidents, and capability constraints. Record why each rejected expansion would weaken the trust proposition or economics. Assign one owner for the customer mission across channels and one owner for each material risk. Continue with weekly operating reviews for availability and service, monthly cohort and contribution reviews, and quarterly architecture reviews covering capital, channel roles, owned-brand conflict, fashion milestones, and governance incidents. Scale only when the reinforcing loop remains visible after acquisition, returns, fulfilment, and working-capital effects.

Checklist

• The consolidated group, vertical, channel, and transaction role are not being confused.
• GMV, NSV, revenue, gross profit, contribution, EBITDA, PAT, and cash flow use stated definitions.
• Every financial fact is dated and traced to an official filing or investor document.
• Shopper, payer, beneficiary, brand partner, supplier, and regulator propositions are explicit.
• Authenticity, claims, storage, traceability, return, and recovery controls are designed.
• Inventory age, availability, markdown, receivables, payables, and cash conversion are visible by category.
• Acquisition cohorts are evaluated after fulfilment, returns, service, and retention.
• Stores have a customer mission, format logic, shared inventory truth, and local contribution model.
• Retail, marketplace, distribution, and owned-brand economics are separated before aggregation.
• Owned-brand placement, claims, reviews, and partner conflicts have governance.
• Beauty and fashion are assessed with different behavioral and operating assumptions.
• Data, personalization, creator, accessibility, and vulnerable-customer risks have guardrails.
• Growth gates require customer value, positive contribution trajectory, cash capacity, and operational readiness.
• Management presentation measures are reconciled with audited statements before investment decisions.

Key takeaways

• Nykaa’s model combines specialized discovery, curated commerce, owned brands, stores, fulfilment, partnerships, and adjacent verticals.
• The proposed advantage is a trust-led system, not ecommerce traffic alone.
• FY26 evidence showed strong consolidated growth and improving profitability, while beauty and fashion retained materially different economics.
• GMV is not revenue, gross margin is not cash, and aggregate growth is not proof that every channel or category creates value.
• Stores, content, data, and owned brands strengthen the model only when they solve customer uncertainty and produce reinforcing economics.
• The case should teach coherent architecture and disciplined measurement, not imitation of visible tactics.

Continue learning

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References

• [s1] Investor Presentation Q4 and FY2025–26. FSN E-Commerce Ventures Limited, 21 May 2026.
• [s2] Integrated Annual Report FY2025–26. FSN E-Commerce Ventures Limited, August 2026.
• [s3] Subsidiaries. FSN E-Commerce Ventures Limited investor relations website, accessed 29 August 2026.
• [s4] Who We Are. Nykaa corporate website, accessed 29 August 2026.
• [s5] What Is Strategy? Michael E. Porter, 1996, Harvard Business Review.
• [s6] The Business Model: Recent Developments and Future Research. Zott, Amit, and Massa, 2011, Journal of Management.
• [s7] Platform Revolution. Parker, Van Alstyne, and Choudary, 2016, W. W. Norton.
• [s8] Guidelines for Prevention and Regulation of Dark Patterns, 2023. Central Consumer Protection Authority, India.
• [s9] Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023. Government of India.

[s1] FSN E-Commerce Ventures Limited, Investor Presentation Q4 and FY2025–26, 21 May 2026, pp. 37–51, https://www.nykaa.com/media/wysiwyg/uiTools/2026-5/Investor-Presentation-Q4-2026.pdf.

[s2] FSN E-Commerce Ventures Limited, Integrated Annual Report FY2025–26, August 2026, https://www.nykaa.com/media/wysiwyg/uiTools/2026-8/Integrated-Annual-Report-FY2025-26.pdf.

[s3] FSN E-Commerce Ventures Limited, “Subsidiaries,” accessed 29 August 2026, https://www.nykaa.com/subsidiaries.

[s4] Nykaa, “Who We Are,” accessed 29 August 2026, https://www.nykaa.com/whoarewe.

[s5] Porter, “What Is Strategy?” Harvard Business Review, November–December 1996, https://hbr.org/1996/11/what-is-strategy.

[s6] Zott, Amit, and Massa, “The Business Model: Recent Developments and Future Research,” Journal of Management 37(4), 2011, https://doi.org/10.1177/0149206311406265.

[s7] Parker, Van Alstyne, and Choudary, Platform Revolution, W. W. Norton, 2016, ISBN 9780393249132.

[s8] Press Information Bureau, Ministry of Consumer Affairs, “Central Consumer Protection Authority issues Guidelines for Prevention and Regulation of Dark Patterns, 2023,” 8 December 2023, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1983994.

[s9] Government of India, Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, India Code, https://www.indiacode.nic.in/indiacode/handle/123456789/22037?view_type=browse.